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BAR BRIEFS
REVIEW OF NORTH DAKOTA DECISIONS
State ex rel Howieson v. Fraser, Adjutant General. Relator applied
for a writ of mandamus to compel the defendant to approve her claim for
payment out of the "Returned Soldier's Fund." It is alleged that rela-
tor's son was mustered into the military service of the United States from
this state in July, 1917, and was killed in action with the American Ex-
peditionary Forces in France in October, 1918, leaving surviving him the
relator, his wife and a minor child. That within a year after his death
the minor child died, that shortly thereafter his widow re-married, with-
out making application for payment of a "bonus" under the "Returned
Soldier's Fund" act, that relator demanded payment of such bonus to her
as the dependent mother of the deceased soldier, and that payment was
refused. From a judgment commanding payment the defendant appeals.
HELD: The "Returned Soldier's Fund" act vests in the Adjutant Gen-
eral power to pass upon all claims for compensation out of the fund.
It makes no provision for an appeal from or a judicial review of the decis-
ions of the Adjutant General in the allowance or rejection of claims.
The decision involved is not subject to judicial review and the action of
the Adjutant General may not be controlled by mandamus. (Opinion
filed March 24th.)
Re: Blackey. In September, 1922, a minor under eighteen years
of age, was adjudged a delinquent child under the Juvenile Court Act, and
committed to the State Industrial School. The order of commitment
was suspended, and the minor paroled and placed in custody of a juvenile
officer, who permitted him to remain at home. In February, 1926, after
the minor had attained the age of twenty years, the judge of the district
court, for reasons stated in the order, revoked the suspension of sen-
tence formerly passed, and directed the sentence to go into effect, and
the minor to be committed to the State Industrial School. This appli-
cation for a writ of habeas corpus was made in behalf of the minor.
HELD: The district court acting under the juvenile court act has only
such power as is given to it by that act. This act clearly makes delinquent,
neglected and dependent children wards of the state, and subjects them
to the care, guardianship and control of the juvenile court until they are
eighteen years of age. A juvenile court has not authority to revive a
sentence to the Industrial School which ha3 been suspended for nearly
four years, and to commit the delinquent child, who at the time of the
attempted revival of sentence, was twenty years of age. (Opinion filed
March 16th.)
Minneapolis Threshing Machine Company v. Hocking. An action to
foreclose a chattel mortgage. The defendant signed a written order for
a threshing machine manufactured by plaintiff. The order contained
many stipulations in print, among which was one which expressly ex-
cludes and negatives all statutory and implied warranties excepting as to
title. The contract provides that in no event shall the seller be subject
to any other or further liability except such as may be expressly given
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and provided for in the contract itself, and only on the conditions stipu-
lated in the contract. The contract allows seven days after discovery
of defects within which to give notice thereof by registered letter. It
was claimed that the contract was against public policy and in violation
of the uniform sales act, and that a rescission had been effected. HELD:
Neither indifference nor carelessness in signing a written contract volun-
tarily is sufficient to absolve a party from the obligations thereof. A
contract involving a legitimate subject matter, the terms of which do not
inherently tend to be subversive of the public good, or contrary to good
morals, will not, merely because its terms are harsh as to one of the
parties, be declared void and unenforceable as contrary to public policy.
Chapter 202, Session Laws of 1917, the uniform sales act, is not a restric-
tion upon the rights of parties to contract, but is a statement of the
rules applicable to the construction of such contracts as they may make.
Any lawful term that the parties may desire in a written contract of
sale may be included. The parties may exclude and negative all implied
warranties which otherwise would arise and be available under the uni-
form sales act. The written contract of sale must be construed as
though this act were incorporated in and made a part of it, and in case
of conflict between the contract and the statute, the latter will prevail.
The act gives the purchaser of machinery the right to rescind within a
reasonable time after the discovery of its unfitness on the notice and in
the manner therein prescribed, if the machinery is unfit for the purposes
for which it was purchased, but it does not extend the authority of agents
of the seller beyond that which they would possess were the statute not
in force. (Opinion filed March 12th.)
City of Bismarck v. Hughes. Under Chapter 175, Laws of 1923, the
City of Bismarck enacted a zoning ordinance. It divides the city into
building districts and prescribes regulations applicable to each district.
Among the regulations relating to "A" Residential District, are restric-
tions as to the distance a residence may be placed from the street. This
action was brought to restrain the defendant from building a residence
in violation of the provisions of the ordinance. HELD: The enactment
of police regulations is a legislative function and the courts cannot ques-
tion the reasonableness or the policy of a statute and cannot interfere
unless the statute is clearly repugnant to some constitutional guaranty.
Chapter 175, Laws of 1923, is a legitimate exercise of the police power
and is not in conflict with the state nor the fourteenth amendment of the
federal constitution. The ordinance enacted under the statute is auth-
orized by it, operates equally and alike upon all residences of each district,
and is not unreasonable or arbitrary but is clearly within the power
granted to the city by the legislature. (Opinion filed March 16th.)
U. S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
The loan of stock and the return of borrowed stock to enable the
completion of a "short" sale involve "transfers of legal title to shares
of stock" within the terms of the Revenue Act and subject to tax.-Pro-
vost vs. U. S., 46 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152.
